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Abstract
Using institutional indicators describing 122 countries, we conduct
an exploratory study highlighting which institutional characteristics
differ across countries with different levels of income and rates of
growth. We describe a country’s institutions by the degree of for-
malization of its regulations, the depersonalization of their implemen-
tation, and by the degree of control and intervention of the state.
Our findings reveal that the variation in state control and interven-
tion decreases along with countries formalization of regulations. This
phenomenon may be explained by institutional convergence, by endo-
geneity in the data and/or by bias. In addition, we find evidence of
a strong relationship between institutions and income levels; however,
we find no such evidence on growth rates. We find mixed evidence for
a relationship between institutions and growth volatility.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents the results of an exploratory study on the relationship
between a country’s institutions and its economic performance. This docu-
ment builds on the analysis of Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008) and confirms
their results on the basis of the latest edition of the Institutional Profile
Database (IPD)1 To the best of our knowledge, Meisel and Ould Aoudia are
the first to conduct exploratory analysis on institutional variation with the
main objective to ‘let the data speak’. Our focus is on describing the insti-
tutional variation between countries from different income classes and with
different growth rates. Our aim is to better understand the differences in
countries institutions, and whether these differences are related to economic
performance.
The key contribution of our research is that we pay close attention to
institutional measurements and to the interpretation of various disaggregated
institutional indicators. We construct institutional indicators from a rich raw
dataset on institutions. Following the approach of Meisel and Ould Aoudia
(2008), we aggregate, not on the basis of predefined theory, but with the aim
to identify institutional characteristics that differ most across countries.
Academics generally agree that institutional development is important for
stimulating income and growth. Institutions structure the incentives that af-
fect behaviours and provide a framework for economic exchanges (North,
1990). Which institutional characteristics set incentives has been a frequent
topic of discussion. Rodrik (2000, p. 4) asked “which institutions mat-
ter” and discussed “five types of market-supporting institutions: property
rights; regulatory institutions; institutions for macro-economic stabilization;
institutions for social insurance; and institutions of conflict management.”
Dixit (2009, p. 5) described three institutional prerequisites that “support
economic activity and economic transactions:” security of property rights,
enforcement of contracts, and collective action. Nevertheless, the functional
form, causality, and consistency of the institutions - performance relationship
are debated by scholars (Jones and Romer, 2009; Easterly and Levine, 2001;
Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2004). For example, Khan (2004) finds
that a small group of countries that experienced higher than average growth
rates, rank low in development with regard to government indicators.
We explore the possibility of a multi-dimensional perspective of institu-
tions. The aggregation method used in this study allows for the formation
of multiple dimensions of institutional conceptions. We find two main insti-
1Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008) use a different aggregation technique (see footnote
13) on IPD data from 2006 which includes 85 countries. More information about the IPD
2009 is in de Crombrugghe, Farla, Meisel, de Neubourg, Ould Aoudia, and Szirmai (2010).
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tutional axes. The first and most dominant axis is interpreted as the axis
of the ‘formalization of regulations’. The second axis we interpret as the
axis of ‘state control and intervention’. We find that the variation in the de-
gree of control and intervention by the state decreases along with countries
formalization of regulations.
Next, these indicators are compared with data on economic performance,
to assess whether institutional differences are related to variations in eco-
nomic performance. This research is closely related to the work of Huynh
and Jacho-Chavez (2009). On the basis of nonparametric methods, the au-
thors analyze the governance-growth relationship using the World Bank gov-
ernance indicators and conclude that there are nonlinearities in the rela-
tionship and that only three of the six indicators are significantly related
to growth. Similarly to research by Lee and Kim (2008) we propose that
different institutional characteristics matter at different stages of economic
performance.
Our data reveals an institutionally heterogeneous world with complex re-
lationships between institutional indicators, income levels, growth rates, and
growth volatility. Our empirical results do support the existence of a strong
relationship between institutions and income level. However, in contrast to
the results of Huynh and Jacho-Chavez (2009) and Lee and Kim (2008), we
find only weak empirical evidence for a positive relationship between institu-
tions and growth. We find mixed evidence for the existence of a relationship
between growth volatility and countries’ institutional development.
Our research is highly relevant for economic and political actors and pro-
vokes a series of questions: which specific institutional characteristics are
important to stimulate growth and to attract investment, are institutions
exportable, and should low income countries mimic the institutions of high
income countries as models for institutional development?
2 Institutional Data
This study is conducted using the Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) 2009
that contains cross-sectional information about 123 countries: 24 developed
countries, 30 Sub-Saharan African countries, 16 Middle East and North
African countries, 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries, 17 Central
Asian and European countries, and 18 developing countries in Asia (see ta-
ble 3 for a country list).2 The analysis that follows only uses 122 countries.
2IPD can be downloaded from the websites of the AFD, Maastricht University, and
CEPII.
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Serbia, one of the countries in the IPD, is excluded from our analysis because
we lack economic performance data for this country.3
IPD 2009 includes 367 elementary variables that purport to explain the
role that institutions play in development. The IPD is based on a survey
conducted by the French Ministry for the Economy, Industry and Employ-
ment (MINEIE) and the French Development Agency (AFD) in the countries
covered. The Institutional Profiles survey was sent to the economic mission
offices of the MINEIE and to the local agencies of AFD present in the sur-
veyed countries.4 The surveys are subjective and the results depend on the
evolving views of the questionnaire respondents. IPD does not incorporate
external data sources.
The survey results are numerical elementary variables in the form of or-
dinal scales. Two types of scales are used: Coding from 1 to 4 when the
question relates to the assessment of a phenomenon, and coding from 0 to
4 when the question relates to the existence of a particular institutional
characteristic (with 0 indicating non-existence) and the quality level of its
application (where 1 corresponds to low quality of application and 4 to high
quality of application).5 In some particular situations, when an institutional
characteristic is/was not applicable to a given country, the questionnaire el-
ementary variables required recoding (see section 6.3 in the appendix for the
list of elementary variables that were recoded).
Benefits of working with IPD include the following: the IPD 2009 in-
cludes raw data about a wide range of governance characteristics.6 IPD has
a wide geographical coverage and the raw data can be used to identify the
institutional aspects that differ most across countries. Following the works
of Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008), the IPD data is fit to study countries
at different stages of development. The variables describe “Institutions that
generate confidence between agents and organizations through arrangements
appropriate to the level of development of each country (...) and the polit-
ical economy of social regulation systems” (Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2008,
pp 45). IPD also contains detailed information on specific concepts from
the New Institutional Economics (NIE), incorporating the recent theoretical
3Serbia has country code YUG in IPD.
4The original questionnaire was in French.
5Survey questions with a scale of 0 to 4, 0 representing the non-existence of a phe-
nomenon, increase the variability of the data (unless the question has no 0 response).
6Unlike the IPD, the World Wide Governance Indicators are based upon datasets that
overlap and are strongly correlated among themselves. These indicators build on 35 dif-
ferent datasets, from 33 different organizations including the IPD 2006. Since 2008, the
World Bank Institute has been using a part of the IPD (from the IPD 2006 version) in pro-
ducing the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi,
2009). The average weight of IPD in the WGI is 7.2%, out of 33 different sources.
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contributions in the field. IPD allows analyzing possible multi-dimensional
relationships and for the documentation of heterogeneity in countries’ institu-
tional development. IPD contains de-facto information about the functioning
of institutions, and contains de-jure information.7 The de-jure information
includes information about the basic existence of a given institutional form,
and the extent to which legal arrangements are transcribed. Most of the
IPD survey questions are de-facto descriptions of states’ functioning that do
not assess de-jure format, for example about states’ degree of capacity, co-
ordination, predictability, effectiveness, respect for law, respect for tradition,
control over agents, coverage. The de-facto information is particularly impor-
tant because the gap between de-facto and de-jure differs between countries
and sectors, impeding the comparison of countries.
3 Aggregation Method
The following section presents the methodology used to aggregate the raw
IPD data and to construct the institutional indicators. We aggregate with the
objective of reducing the dataset to gain comprehension. We use 122 country
observations and 333 elementary variables, in total 40,626 data points.8 By
aggregating the data, information (variation) is lost; we aim to preserve the
maximum information.
In the first step of aggregation we reduce the number of elementary vari-
7Some of the survey questions can be interpreted both as de-facto and as de-jure ques-
tions.
8The count of 333 elementary variables excludes 34 survey questions that were judged
to be defective. Accordingly, in the sequel of the paper, no use is made of the follow-
ing 17 subheadings: Frequency of bankruptcy over the last five years (a605); Importance
of economic zones (b301); Privatizations in the non-financial sector since 2006 (b400);
Nationalizations in the non-financial sector since 2006 (b401); Implementation of the pri-
vatization programme(non-financial sector) (b402); Single exchange rate (b405); Diversity
of land tenure right systems (b606); Government recognition of the diversity of land right
systems (b607); Demand for land (b610); Land tenure and large investors(b611); Joint
ventures (b802); Foreigner access to land (b803); Privatization in the financial sector since
2006 (c400); Nationalization in the financial sector since 2006 (c401); National sovereign
wealth funds: policy and timeline (c502); Financial system regulation reforms in the last
three years (c705); Strikes (d701). Reasons for removal were the following. Some of these
variables were suspected to contain biased responses, to be interesting only for a small
selection of countries, to describe institutional change without considering the point of de-
parture. Some of the elementary variables suffer from logical inconsistency. For example,
question B400 ‘Privatizations/nationalizations in the non-financial sector since 2006’ is
followed by B402 ‘Implementation of the privatization programme (non-financial sector)’.
If the score for B400 is 0 (no privatization), the score given by a respondent to all the
elementary variables in B402 should also be 0.
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ables from the responses collected in the survey to 116 items.9 We follow the
original structure of the survey: the questions (in 4-digit code) are initially
grouped under a common heading depending on their thematic proximity, re-
sulting in a smaller number of indicators (in 3-digit code). For example, the
sub-group A300 (3-digit) ‘Transparency of public economic action’ is formed
by the aggregation of these six elementary elementary variables (4-digits):
A3000, A3001, A3002, A3003, A3004 and A3005 (see section 6.2 for an ex-
tract of the questionnaire). Ordinary (Pearson) correlations, as well as poly-
choric correlations (taking into account the ordinal nature of the data), are
calculated for each of these sub-groups to verify that the 4-digit elementary
variables are positively correlated. In the case elementary variables do not
have a positive correlation the elementary variables are not aggregated and
remain separate variables. The elementary variables A8010, A8011, A8012,
and A8013 are not aggregated under the sub-heading ‘The countries’ polit-
ical relations with the leading global or regional players’ (A801) because of
their nature. Some elementary variables are aggregated by multiplication
(see section 6.4).
The data is aggregated by taking the weighted mean of the elementary
variable scores per country. The weights are based on the standard devia-
tions of the scores across countries. A 4-digit elementary variable with an
identical score for all the countries (indicating it does not discriminate be-
tween countries) has a zero weight in the aggregated indicator. The better
an elementary variable discriminates between countries, the higher its weight
is in the aggregated index. Thus, this methodology uses the dispersion of
the variables, so as to give more weight to those elementary variables that
better differentiate between countries.10
Finding an appropriate structure to analyze and aggregate the institu-
tional data is a main conceptual challenge. We choose to aggregate the data
using the structure offered by the IPD database because it differentiates be-
tween ‘institutional functions’ that are relevant to the public sector and that
are relatively homogeneous (Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2008). The institu-
tional functions offer a structural division, that corresponds to different lines
9We distinguish between the variables in the non-aggregated dataset and the variables
in the dataset resulting from the first level (partial) aggregation by retaining the name
‘elementary variable’ for the former, and labeling the latter as ‘items’.
10The method of aggregation has also been used to aggregate previous versions of the
IPD database (Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2008). The formula to aggregate is: [input of
country ‘X’ for elementary variable ‘A’ * (standard deviation for all countries of elementary
variable A) + input country ‘X’ for elementary variable ‘B’ * (standard deviation for all
countries of elementary variable ‘B’) ] / (standard deviation elementary variable ‘A’ +
standard deviation elementary variable ‘B’).
6
of authority and control under which states organize society. The IPD struc-
ture offers nine institutional functions, each containing a battery of variables:
(1) Political institutions, (2) Safety, law and order, (3) Public governance,
(4) Markets’ operating freedom, (5) Coordination, (6) Security of transac-
tions and contracts, (7) Regulations and corporate governance, (8) Openness
to the outside world, (9) Social cohesion. Together the functions represent
the social-political-economic arena of a country’s institutions. The institu-
tional functions and observations are given equal weight in order to preserve
the chosen structure. Thereby, the institutional functions help to provide a
balanced framework for analysis when quantifying the broader institutional
framework.
We further aggregate the items using principal component analysis (PCA),
a method of variable reduction that retains the maximum variation from the
raw data.11 A PCA is run on the set of aggregated items that belong to each
institutional function. The results of the PCA are indicators, also called
principal components (PCs), that summarize the information of the IPD
database on national institutional profiles. The first three PCs are retained
for each function (9 functions x 3 PCs).
The PCs are orthogonal variables and each PC contains information about
a specific dimension of an institutional function that we interpret on the
basis of the loadings, the first three containing the largest variation across
countries. We choose to retain three PCs per function after consideration of
the eigenvalues of the PCs, the inflection points of their graphs, the variance
explained by the first three PCs, and the loadings of the PCs.12
The first PCs have the highest loadings and the highest variance. For
all functions, the variation explained by the first three principal components
ranges from 61% to 94% of the total variation. By retaining three PCs, in-
stead of only one or two PCs for each function, it is less likely that important
information is excluded. Despite the differences in the number of items used
for each PCA, we treat the functions separately and avoiding giving them
weights until the next level of PCA. Thereby, the structure of the institu-
tional functions is respected giving equal importance to each institutional
11This frequently used data aggregation technique is documented in guidelines about
the construction of composite indicators (OECD, 2005).
12The rotation of axis is a statistical technique that may improve the ease of interpreta-
tion of the PCA results. The institutional functions are tested under the varimax rotation
method, which keeps the PCs orthogonal, and under the oblique oblimin rotation method
that does not keep the PCs orthogonal. The results of the oblique oblimin generally pro-
duce PCs with a low correlation. The rotation space is set for the first three PCs because
these contain most of the information. The results do not differ substantially and support
the interpretation found in the PCAs without rotation, because of this, the non-rotated
PCs are utilized for further analysis.
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function; data is reduced systematically.
In order to summarize the broader institutional framework, the 27 PCs
are further aggregated. We run a second PCA on the 27 PCs.13 The resulting
first two PCs are explored in this document.
The indicators are orthogonal and each indicator provides very different
information about the institutional characteristics of countries.14 We retain
only the first two PCs because these are the only PCs for which we find a
clear interpretation. The interpretations of the aggregated data — the 27
PCs describing institutional functions and the final two PCs summarizing
the countries’ institutions — are described in the following sections.
4 Results
4.1 Interpreting Institutional Functions
The institutional functions represent the social-political-economic arena of a
country’s institutions. The results from the PCA made for each institutional
function are three PCs per function. These PCs cover a wide spectrum of
institutional aspects that describe a country’s institutional landscape. The
PCs are presented in table 1. It should be noted that, the descriptions of the
scales and poles are tentative interpretations of the PCs. The countries are
projected on the indicators, as possessing either a high or a low degree of the
institutional component (e.g., a high degree of democracy and civil liberties).
The country codes mentioned in parentheses indicate which countries are
positioned at the very end of the axes. Interpreting and naming the PCs
is complex; the most relevant item or pattern is extracted on the basis of
marginal differences in loadings. The PC loadings on an item are determined
by the variation in the country’s scores of the item.
13PCA on the disaggregated elementary variables/items results in PCs that are difficult
to interpret; the loadings of PCs are low and are relatively more similar. Such method
has been used in Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008). In this study we trace the underlying
items that explain the PCs following a predefined structure of institutional functions.
We maintain the assumption that this structure is relatively homogeneous. Despite the
difference in methodology, the results of this study confirm the results of Meisel and Ould
Aoudia (2008).
14The aggregation method used in these analyses has been compared with alternative
methodologies. Different methods tested include: retaining different number of PCs, re-
taining PCs with eigenvalue larger than 1, PCA using covariance, and PCA using a reduced
set of indicators, further aggregation using simple and weighted mean. The different meth-
ods did not yield different interpretations of the data. The different methods do result in
indicators that capture different percentages of variance of the data. We choose to work
with a method that maintains the IPD structure and maximizes the variance of the data.
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To understand the significance of table 1, it is important to remember
that these final results are based on an aggregation of 333 survey questions
on institutions. The items with high variation across counties are retrieved.
For example, we find that there is a high variation in the security and control
over legal armed forces.
Table 1: Principal Components of IPD
Institutional
Function
Name of Scale High Pole Low Pole
PC1: Democracy and civil
liberties (63%)
Democracy and
civil liberties
(CAN, AUS, NOR)
No or little democ-
racy and civil lib-
erties (QAT, SYR,
AZE)
1 Political
institutions
(11)
PC2: Political legitimacy
- authorities capacity to
reach out to society &
population acceptance of
authority / Right to strike
and organize union activ-
ity (13%)
High political legit-
imacy / No right to
strike (ARE, SAU,
CHN)
Disputed politi-
cal legitimacy /
Right to strike,
collectively bargain
and organize trade
unions (TCD,
ZWE, TGO)
PC3: Autonomy of lo-
cal authority and political
stability (7%)
High political sta-
bility (KWT, MLT,
BWA)
High level of de-
centralized author-
ity (ZWE, ZMB,
UGA)
PC1: Public security and
security and control of po-
litical authority over legal
armed forces (26%)
Control of violence
(DNK, SWE, CHE)
Lack of control
of violence (SDN,
CAF, PAK)
2 Safety, law
and order
(4)
PC2: Control of state vio-
lence by NGOs (21%)
Control of vio-
lence (LBY, VNM,
GHA)
Lack of control
of violence (TUR,
PAK, ISR)
PC3: International secu-
rity / tensions (18%)
No tensions (CIV,
GTM, TGO)
Major tensions
(ISR, ETH, USA)
PC1: Corruption and
functioning of legal system
(51%)
Control and ef-
fectiveness (NLD,
CAN, DNK)
Lack of control
and ineffectiveness
(ZWE, ZAR, HTI)
3 Public
Governance
(17)
PC2: Control over orga-
nizations. Organization
operational autonomy and
freedom to create new or-
ganizations (11%)
(Lack of state con-
trol over /) total
freedom and auton-
omy (UKR, ROM,
NGA)
No freedom and
autonomy (CUB,
ONM, SGP)
Continued on next page
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PC3: Influence of major
economic stakeholders on
public policy and the use
of income from natural re-
sources (6%)
Frequent influence
(LBY, JPN, IRL)
Very rare influence
(CUB, CHL, CMR)
PC1: Free functioning of
markets (42%)
No controls and
administered rates
(DNK, FIN, CAN)
Controls and ad-
ministered rates
(IRN, LBY, YEM)
4 Markets
operating
freedom (5)
PC2: Flexicurity in the
labour market (21%)
No or precarious
employee secu-
rity (NGA, TCD,
ROM)
Practice of em-
ployee security in
profit making pub-
lic sector (ARE,
QAT, UKR)
PC3: Re-training of em-
ployees (16%)
High effectiveness
(TAI, ETH, DNK)
No measures (CYP,
ARE, HKG)
PC1: Strategic planning
and vision for growth
(60%)
High priority
(CAN, IRL, DNK)
Low priority (CAF,
COG, AZE)
5 Coordina-
tion (18)
PC2: Government strate-
gic vision / outlook of
young nationals (7%)
Strong vision and
positive outlook
(OMN, ARE,
CHN)
Lack of vision /
high potential mi-
gration (TAI, BEL,
LBN)
PC3: Culture of cooper-
ation and dialogue struc-
tures / competence of
bank executives (5%)
Little or no cooper-
ation and dialogue
(CHL, LTU, SAU)
Strong cooperation
and dialogue / high
competence (ETH,
IRN, HKG)
PC1: Contracts, transac-
tions and property rights
(55%)
High security and
protection (AUT,
NLD, GBR)
Little or no se-
curity and protec-
tion (COG, ZWE,
KHM)
6 Security
of transac-
tions and
contracts
(20)
PC2: Transactions and
property protection /
respect for (traditional)
land property (8%)
Strong enforcement
/ respect (VEN,
CAF, CZE)
Lack of enforce-
ment / respect
(QAT, AZE,
MNG)
PC3: Property contracts
(6%)*
High importance
of public contracts
(ZAR, DZA, AUT)
Weak enforcement
(KWT, GHA,
LBN)
PC1: Market regulations
(47%)
Strong regulations
(CAN, DNK, AUT)
Few / weak imple-
mentation of regu-
lations (QAT, IRN,
SYR)
7 Regula-
tions and
corporate
governance
(14)
PC2: Wage bargaining
/ importance of public
shareholders (9%)
High individual
wage bargaining /
high importance of
public shareholders
(CUB, LBY, NOR)
Low importance of
public shareholders
(HTI, BGR, HKG)
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
PC3: Land development
(economic activity &
housing) policy (8%)
Effective policy
(DEU, EST, BGD)
No policy (OMN,
MYS, UZB)
PC1: Trade and financial
market openness to for-
eign investors (34%)
High openness
(EST, GBR, NLD)
Closed economy
(IRN, SYR, CUB)
8 Openness
to the out-
side world
(10)
PC2: International rela-
tions with Japan, China,
and the USA (16%)*
Close relations
(KOR, DEU,
HKG)
Weak relations
(HTI, ZWE, BRA)
PC3: Relations with
neighboring countries /
International relations
with China (10%)*
Close relations
(GHA, MNG,
AUS)
Strong regional ties
(DOM, SVN, SYR)
PC1: Social security reg-
ulations / traditional soli-
darity and social network
relationships (49%)
Formalized regula-
tions (CAN, FIN,
NZL)
Personalized sys-
tems of solidarity
(COG, NPL, CAF)
9 Social co-
hesion (17)
PC2: Nationalistic feeling
/ social inclusion (9%)
Strong sense of
national identity
& substantial seg-
gregation (QAT,
KWT, OMN)
No strong nation-
alistic feeling (ITA,
VEN, BEN)
PC3: Micro lending / na-
tionalistic feeling (7%)*
No strong national-
istic feeling (COG,
CAF, SAU)
Large scale lending
(PHL, COL, MNG)
* These indicators have a weak interpretation
 In parentheses are the number of items used to run the PCA
Institutional Functions and Variation between Income Classes
We construct four income classes, low income, lower-middle and upper-
middle income, and high income, using real GDP per capita data from the
Penn World Tables (PWT) 6.3.15 The GDP is calculated using the chain
series method, constant prices with 2005 as the base year. We use data from
1993, the earliest period available for our sample, to minimize the endoge-
nous nature in the data. The income class limits are the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentiles of real GDP per capita in 1993, the earliest period available for
our sample.16 Table 2 provides more details about the income classes. Table
15We construct four income classes with the intention of illustrating differences and
similarities between reasonably sized classes.
16The World Bank Atlas method uses a different method to calculate income classes
(income classification). The World Bank classification as of July 1st, 2010 is based on 2009
GNI per capita. The groups are: group low income, $995 or less; lower-middle income,
$996 - $3,945; upper-middle income, $3,946 - $12,195; and high income, $12,196 or more
11
3 in the appendix reports, the income class for the 122 countries used in the
analysis.
Table 2: Mean statistics by income class
Income class Growth mean Income mean
US $ % (1993-
2007)
Population
mean, in
thousands
(1993*)
Low: ≤ 2,041 2.1 1,294 50,639
LowerMiddle: 2,041 - 6,336 2.4 4,203 66,219
UpperMiddle: 6,336 - 15,530 3.0 9,711 29,382
High: ≥ 15,530 2.4 25,020 27,481
Sources: IPD 2009, PWT 6.3
Income base year is 2005 (chain series method, constant prices)
*Population data and income data for the income classes are from 1993
Figure 1 is the box and whisker diagrams for the first function and illus-
trates the cross-country variation for each PC (F1PC1, F1PC2, and F1PC3).
This function is arbitrarily chosen as an example and the figures of the other
functions are in the appendix, section 6.5. Figure 1 shows that there is varia-
tion in the indicators between income classes, and within income classes. The
scales of the PCs are normalized on a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 is associated
with the high pole.17
The figures show that the values for the first PCs on average increase
across income classes. An exception is F2PC1, where countries in both low
and middle low income classes have a low control of domestic violence. There
are high income countries that have some institutional characteristics that
are similar to those of low income countries. We find relatively little variation
between the median and the (upper bound) largest values.
(World Bank, 2010). For our research purpose, GDP is a more interesting measurement
because we are interested comparing countries domestic economic productivity (and not
country nationals economic productivity).
17The first PCs by definition contain most of the variation in the data.
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Figure 1: Country classification by income: function 1
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The second PC ‘Political legitimacy’ (F1PC2), has a similar pattern
across income classes as the pattern of the first PCs; the values increase
along with the income classes.
The interpretation of the second and third PCs is more delicate and
interpreting the direction of the item accurately is important. For example,
our results show that some low income countries score high on ‘flexicurity’ in
the labour market (F4PC2), a factor expressing the degree of flexibility in the
public and in the private labour market, labour mobility, and profitability
of enterprise. Japan and Qatar are positioned on the lower bound of this
PC (‘practice of employee security in profit making public sector’), whereas
the USA, Romania and Sub Saharan countries are positioned on the upper
bound.
Following the income distribution according to F3PC2, in low income
countries state’s have low control over organizations. In addition, national-
istic feelings are relatively low (F9PC3) in low income countries. F9PC2 is
shaped by oil rich countries that score high on nationalistic feelings and high
on segregation. F1PC3, is shaped by countries with a high level of decen-
13
tralized authority; there is a relatively high level of variation within the low
income class.
We do not find a pattern for all second and third PCs. The third PCs
have relatively long tails. As illustrated by the diagrams, each function has
a few outliers. F2PC3 has a lot of outliers on the lower bound of the PC in
the high income class. These are rich countries that have major international
security tensions.
Institutional Functions and Variation between Growth Classes
Similarly as presented in the previous section, we construct four growth
classes.18 The growth classes are constructed using data on real GDP per
capita (chain series, 2005 constant prices) from the PWT 6.3. We choose
to take a longer growth period than is usually taken, 1993-2007, to avoid
selecting years of crisis and/or reconstruction for certain country groups and
also to smooth short run business cycles.19 The growth data is constructed
using the annualized growth calculation over time [t, t+p]:
gi,t+p =
1
p
(yi,t+p − yi,t)
Where yi,t denotes the natural logarithm of the real GDP per capita,
measured in constant prices, for country i at time t. The growth classes are
constructed using the data’s 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles; low growth,
lower-middle growth, upper-middle growth, and high growth.20 Table 3 in
the appendix lists the growth class for each country. The countries with the
lowest growth rate in our data are Zimbabwe, democratic republic of Congo,
Gabon, Madagascar, and Cote d‘Ivoire. Countries with the highest growth
rates are: China, Estonia, Latvia, Angola, and Ireland.
18We construct four growth classes to allow comparison between the growth classes, and
also to allow comparison with the previously constructed income classes. For example,
‘high income’ countries are classified under low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high
growth class.
19Data for Bahrain (BHR) is missing in the year 2007; we use data from 2006 for this
observation.
20Following the growth data quartiles, low growth is less than 1.48% growth, lower-
middle growth is between 1.48% and 2.47%, upper-middle between 2.47% and 3.61%
growth, and high growth is higher than 3.61% growth.
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Figure 2: Country classification by growth: function 7
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The following section describes the figures with the growth classification
for the institutional functions. Figure 2 is based on the PCs of the func-
tion ‘regulations and corporate governance’ and the remaining figures are
illustrated in the appendix, in section 6.6.
As is illustrated by the box and whisker plots, most of the median values
are relatively similar across growth classes. Furthermore, the box plots have
a wide variation within the upper and lower interquartile ranges, and have
long tails. Exceptions include box plots of the low-growth class. Several
of the first PCs in this growth class are positioned on the lower bound of
this scale. Institutional characteristics that describe these countries are the
following: high corruption and ineffective legal system, market controls and
administered rates, low prioritization of growth, low security of contracts,
few and / or weak implementation of market regulations, and personalized
systems of solidarity.
These observations are hinting that there is no simple relation between
countries’ institutions and growth. Countries may not be required to have
a specific determined set of institutional characteristics in order to gener-
15
ate growth. However, the data also shows that the low growth countries do
not have formalized institutional characteristics. Therefore, no or little for-
malization of institutional characteristics appears to be a possible recipe for
negative growth.
4.2 Interpreting Institutions
The final results of the data aggregation are two indicators (PCs) that can
be interpreted as two main axes of institutional development. In this section
we propose tentative interpretations. The first axis represents the extent of a
country’s institutional formalization of regulations and the depersonalization
of their implementation (this axis explains 28% of the variance of this PCA).
This main axis is a construct of the first PCs of each function.21
The countries Zimbabwe, Chad, Iran, Congo, and Togo are some of the
countries that form one extreme of the axis; these countries oppose the other
extreme of the axis shaped by Canada, Germany, Denmark, Belgium and
the Netherlands. The first group of countries has societies that are based on
strong interpersonal relationships whereas in the second group of countries
society is shaped by impersonal relationships.
This axis may be related to the theoretical open access framework pro-
posed by North et al. (2009); we identify countries that can be classified as
‘Open Access Order’ (OAO) as countries with formalized institutions, and
we identify countries that can be classified as ‘Limited Access Order’ (LAO)
as countries with personalized institutions. (North et al., 2009).22 More-
over, This axis may also be related to the World Bank concepts of ‘good
governance’, and ‘rule of law’ (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2009).
The second axis represents the degree of control and intervention by the
state (this axis explains 16% of the variance of this PCA). Mostly, this axis
21The first main axis is characterized by the following characteristics: democracy and
civil liberties, security and control over legal armed forces, corruption and functioning
of legal system, free functioning of markets, strategic planning and vision for growth,
contracts, transactions and property rights, market regulations, trade and financial market
openness to foreign investors, and social security regulations.
22North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) identified three doorstep conditions that are nec-
essary (but not sufficient) for societies with privileged elites to make a transition to a
system that relies on competition and has open access to organizations: (i) rule of law
for elites, (ii) perpetually lived organization in the public and private spheres, and (iii)
consolidation of military power under control of a political system. “The three doorstep
conditions illuminate the circumstances under which elites in natural states have incentives
to create institutions that formalize their relationships, creating impersonal relationships
between elites” (North et al., 2009, p. 188). These circumstances include, as identified
by the authors, the establishment of a legal system, the foundation of contracts, and a
reduction in the risk of violent uprisings caused by military.
16
is shaped by F1PC2, describing state’s degree of political legitimacy and
union activity, and by F3PC2, describing the degree of intervention in the
private sector.23 state’s degree of legitimacy determines state’s control, such
that undisputed legitimacy guarantees the state power. The axis summarizes
that institutions differ strongly with respect to the degree of state influence
on the private sector and on households (e.g. access to health care, education,
infrastructure, media).
This second axis may be related to countries political-governmental sys-
tem. The axis is mostly shaped by the items describing authoritarian states
as opposed to economies with a great degree of freedom and autonomy; and
countries with high political legitimacy opposed by an organized civil soci-
ety. Countries with a strong state presence are: Cuba, Qatar, Syria, Iran,
and United Arab Emirates. Non-authoritarian, non-interventionist or laissez-
faire economies are Haiti, Cameroon, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and
Guatemala. This is either because the state is weak or because of a free
market arrangement. Western European countries, the USA, Canada, and
Australia are at neither extreme of this axis. Singapore, a country with a
strong state that prioritizes collective welfare, is positioned in the north-
eastern corner of the figure.
Figure 3 shows the dispersion of the countries’ institutional profile on the
two main institutional axes.24 The countries are dispersed in a funnel shape.
The funnel shape suggests a partition of the countries in three clusters: (i)
a cluster of countries with formalized institutions, (ii) a cluster of countries
with fragmented and personalized institutions, and (iii) a cluster of countries
with authoritarian and personalized social institutions.
23Other indicators that load moderately on the second axis are second PCs and some
third PCs.
24The scales of the PCs are normalized. PC2 is inversed in order to facilitate the
comparison with the figures produced by Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008).
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Figure 3: 1st factorial plane of PCA
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IPD 2009: 122 countries projected on the 1st factorial plane of the PCA
The first cluster located on the right hand side of the axis are countries
organized according to democracy and free market principles; security of land
ownership, market competition, transparency and information of market, se-
curity of transactions and contracts, good governance, control of corruption
administration and a strong legal system. States embrace environmental
technology and the adaptation and innovation of organizations. These are
characteristics of developed countries, where the middle classes are repre-
sented by the state.
The second cluster of countries consists of fragmented and personalized
countries is positioned on the south-west corner and the third cluster consists
of authoritarian and personalized countries is positioned on the north-west
of figure 3. Both are clusters of countries that are based on traditional prop-
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erty rights and state ownership, and the society is dependent on traditional
solidarity. Traditional customs are reinforced through social contracts, giv-
ing less importance to the protection of formal and legal contracts. States
are submitted to pressure from (external) donors. The scale of micro-credit
provisions and strict control over sovereign funds guidelines may also be in-
fluenced by donors. The countries in positioned on the south-west of the
axes have with weak or failing states that have limited capacities to steer
and strategically implement policy. This is a non-interventionist economy.
The authoritarian cluster has much stronger capacity to steer public policy.
Figure 3 illustrates that it is difficult to compare institutions because
of their multifaceted diversity. Based on the interpretations of the PCs,
only the countries with formalized institutions have relative homogeneous
institutional characteristics. The dispersion amongst developing countries is
extremely wide. The descriptive analysis concludes that institutions have to
be considered in a more complex space than the ‘good governance’ and ‘bad
governance’ scale. In accordance with North et al. (2009); Meisel and Ould
Aoudia (2008); Khan (2004), we find that it is rather difficult to determine
what the optimal path of institutional development is. Is the institutional
development path a straight trajectory from depersonalized regulations to
formalized regulations? What is the role of the state in steering development?
4.2.1 Convergence, Endogeneity, or Bias?
Countries with formalized institutional characteristics have relatively low
variation in state control and intervention, and countries with personalized
institutional characteristics have relatively high variation in state control and
intervention. Figure 3 illustrates that if a country with personalized institu-
tional characteristics were to make a transition to a country with formalized
institutional characteristics, it could have, as starting point, authoritarian
and personalized institutions, fragmented and personalized institutions, or
it could be situated anywhere within this range. In this section we propose
three explanations for the funnel shape; convergence, endogeneity, and bias.
Firstly, the funnel effect can be due to convergence of countries de-facto
and de-jure institutional characteristics. Institutional convergence can be
explained as a gradual process that occurs when a country’s institutions
change and start to resemble the institutions of another country, or group
of countries. The de-facto convergence of institutional characteristics is a
convergence in the functioning of institutions. The de-jure convergence of
institutional characteristics is a convergence in institutions form, and can
also be referred to as institutional isomorphism.25
25The term institutional isomorphism was used by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) to ex-
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Institutional convergence may be caused by one or by several factors, such
as, cultural similarity, common colonial influences, lower transaction costs,
economies of scale, elites preferences during reforms, imitation of legal stan-
dards, pressure from media and academics. Institutional convergence may
also be positively influenced by the increasing role of international organiza-
tions in standardizing regulations. Convergence could be a result of interna-
tional intervention or pressures during crisis or war. Moreover, international
organizations’ promotion and use of good governance and democracy as a
conditionality, may influence developing countries to enhance performance
in accordance with international measurement criteria.
Similar to the equilibrium theory described in Prezeworski (2005), the
convergence can be due to the establishment of an equilibrium in political
representation, determining the degree of control and intervention of the
state. Prezeworski (2005) argues that democracy is positively related to
income. In high income countries, democracy is the preferred outcome and
is the equilibrium outcome. In poor countries, the survival of a democratic
regime is dependent on income equality and on the distribution of political
representations’ military force (Prezeworski, 2005).
Secondly, the funnel effect can be caused by measurement endogeneity.
Countries’ institutional developmental path influences the object of measure-
ment. The presumed ‘good governance’ countries rank high on the indicators,
democracy, corruption, freedom of press, whereas aid receiving countries rank
low on these chosen measurements.26 Theories about institutional develop-
ment may be influenced by the institutional characteristics of generally high
performing countries, and they essentially determine what we measure.27
Thirdly, these results may suffer from bias in the survey measurement
criteria, due to the survey respondents bias, and due to bias in our inter-
pretations. The construction and interpretation of institutional indicators is
a delicate issue, where preconceptions influence interpretation. The under-
standing of a country’s institutional development is shaped by institutional
and non-institutional performance indicators, and by mental models. Men-
tal models are implicit assumptions, preconceptions, generalizations such as
plain similarity in organizations.
26Some institutional indicators (e.g., the Doing Business indicators and Enterprise sur-
veys) systematically rank rich countries on top of one-dimensional institutional devel-
opment scales and rank poor countries at the bottom. Hereby, the top of the scale is
interpreted as ‘good’ institutions or ‘good’ governance and the bottom of the scale is
‘bad institutions’ or ‘bad’ governance. Moreover, based on the preconception that good
governance leads to growth, the famous institutional indicators, the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators, are used to promote good governance. In practice, the indicators
determine developmental policy and countries’ access to investment.
27Following the words of Einstein, ‘it is the theory that decides what we can observe’.
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‘corruption is bad’ or ‘democracy increases growth’ that may or may not be
true.
Organizations and institutions carry mental models that influence meth-
ods and operations. Ideas about the functioning of countries institutions and
their bearing on economic performance are based on the countries economists
are most familiar with. For example,“the consensus argues that to generate
growth, states have to protect stable property rights, defined by strong con-
tract enforcement, low expropriation risk, and low corruption; they have to
ensure undistorted markets defined by low rents; and they have to achieve
democratic accountability and civil society participation to keep the state
in check” (Khan, 2004, p. 2). Preconceptions may lead researchers to ex-
plain ‘unfamiliar’ institutions on the basis of more ‘familiar’ institutions, or
to compare the institutions of high growth developing countries with todays
developed countries — such as Germany and the USA — during their growth
period in the 19th century.
4.3 The relationship between Countries’ Institutions
and Economic Performance
In this section we present the scatter plots illustrating the relationship be-
tween institutions and GDP and growth. We use the same data as presented
in previous sections, the IPD data on countries’ institutions and the economic
performance data from PTW 6.3.
The PC1 - countries’ income level relationship and PC2 - countries’ in-
come level relationship are illustrated in figure 4. The figure shows that there
is a positive relation between institutions and income level. These results do
not shed light on the causality of the relationship. However, based on the
analysis of the distinguishing IPD items, we find arguments supporting the
existence of a two-way relationship. We find that countries with governments
and ruling classes that have a strong vision for development, high growth and
innovation have high income levels. This may suggest that elite groups with
such vision create an environment for sustaining higher levels of income. We
also find evidence for the importance of items such as security of contracts,
strong legal system, the formalization of regulations. The aforementioned
institutional characteristics are costly to implement, suggesting that high in-
come countries are better positioned to pursue the development of formal
institutional regulations. Moreover, having a formal regulatory system can
support countries to maintain higher levels of income.
Closer analysis of the figures reveals that the difference in variance can
be attributed to the disparity due to rentier and centrally planned countries
21
as is explained below. The positive relationship between the formalization
of regulations and income level is illustrated in the first plot of figure 4. One
particularity is that rentier —oil rich— countries appear to have an income
wedge increasing their relative income.
The second plot depicts the relationship between PC2 (the degree of
control and intervention by the state) and income level. The figure shows that
countries with an important role for the state and high level of intervention
have high income levels. The centrally planned economies and communist
regimes influence the strength of the relation. These countries have a relative
lower income level.
22
Figure 4: Institutions and income level
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GDP = 8.66 + 0.31PC1 − 0.20PC2 [R.sq = 0.67; Root MSE = 0.67]
Source: IPD 2009 and PWT 6.3
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The plots in figure 5 depict the institutions-growth relationship. We
highlight that whilst countries vary in terms of institutional characteristics
and real GDP per capita growth for the period 1993-2007, there is no clear
relationship between the two. At best, the relationship is very weak. This
conclusion could imply that countries’ growth potential is rather equal.
Several countries with fragmented and personalized regimes have nega-
tive growth levels. Therefore, we may have some evidence for a negative
relationship between growth and countries with weak and failing states lack-
ing regulations.
In this analysis we do not control for the influence of human capital,
culture, and other factors that influence institutional development. The re-
gression analyses included in our descriptive statistics are not conclusive but
are solely used to enhance basic understanding.
The results and interpretations of our analyses are sensitive to the in-
clusion and exclusion of countries and survey questions. For example, the
exclusion of high income countries from the analyses would yield a different
1st factorial plane with no or little funnel shape projection of countries. Stud-
ies based on a smaller selection of elementary variables would yield different
PCs.
24
Figure 5: Institutions and growth
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Source: IPD 2009 and PWT 6.3
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4.4 The Relationship between Countries’ Institutions
and Growth (In)Stability
In the preceding subsection we found that there is no simple relationship
between countries’ institutions and growth rates. In this section we further
examine growth; we identify the relation between countries’s institutions and
the annual volatility of growth. Growth volatility is an important indicator
of economic performance. For example, risk-adverse investors may be dis-
couraged to invest in countries with a history of high volatility of growth
rates because they may predict further instability. Rodrik (2000) finds that
the variation in growth is higher in countries with an autocratic regime type
than in countries with a democracy, and that therefore, “living under an au-
thoritarian regime is a riskier gamble than living under a democracy” (2000,
p. 18). We compare growth volatility with the two main axes of institutional
development.
For this exercise, we use the growth rate of real GDP chain per capita as
measured by PWT 6.3 (2005 constant prices) for the year 1994 to 2007. We
calculate the standard deviation of the growth rates for each country.28 The
results are presented in the figures 6, 7, and 8.29
First, we find that whilst the majority of countries have a relative low
volatility of growth rates, several countries experience high growth volatility
during our period of analysis. On average, countries with formalized insti-
tutions (PC1) have less volatility in growth rates than countries with a per-
sonalized institutions do. The average volatility is higher for countries with
personalized institutions because some of these countries have high growth
volatility. For this sample selection and period of analysis, there are no coun-
tries with formalized institutions that have a relatively high growth volatility.
Moreover, following figure 6, it appears that the wide fluctuations of volatility
in growth rates decrease along with countries’ formalization of regulations.
Providing a formalized regulatory framework is likely to contribute to the
stability of growth rates. Countries with personalized institutions may expe-
rience both rapid growth accelerations and episodes of negative growth, but
sustaining positive growth is challenging.
Secondly, we find no clear relationship between growth volatility and the
degree of ‘control and intervention by the state’. This result is interest-
ing for this may imply that, implementing ‘more’ or ‘less’ control, policy
28In this exercise, data for Bahrain (BHR) is missing in the year 2007; we use data from
2006 for this observation.
29Calculations with the mean absolute deviation growth rates yield a more robust mea-
sure of the growth variability. In this case, the results calculated using the standard
deviation of the growth rates are strong; additional robustness is not necessary.
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and regulations — laissez-faire versus interventionism — should be (only) a
secondary priority for the state. Figures 7 and 8 allow to compare the per-
formance of different income and growth classes. The figures illustrate that
there are countries with high volatility and high growth and countries with
low volatility and high growth. We find no clear pattern between countries
with different levels or income and growth volatility.
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Figure 6: Institutions and growth volatility
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Source: IPD 2009 and PWT 6.3
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Figure 7: Institutions and growth volatility, by income class
2
4
3
4 4
2
4
1
1
1
2
4
2
3
3
1
44
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
4 3
4
4
2
2
2
2
4
3
1
4
4
3
4
1
42
421
3
2
1 4
3
4
4
2
4
3
1
1
34
1
3
4
2
3
2
2
1 31
31
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
1 44
1 4
4
2
32
2
33
2
4
2
3
4
1
1
4
3
3 4
2
3
1
1 3
2
2
1
1
3
3
4
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
2
0
5
10
15
20
St
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 g
ro
wt
h:
 1
99
4−
20
07
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
PC1: formalization of regulations
1: Low 2:LowerMiddle 
3:UpperMiddle 4:High 
Growth volatility = 3.88 − 0.51PC1 −0.04PC2 [R.sq = 0.23; Root MSE = 2.56]
Source: IPD 2009 and PWT 6.3
2
4
3
44
2
4
1
1
1
2
4
2
3
3
1
44
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
43
4
4
2
2
2
2
4
3
1
4
4
3
4
1
42
4 21
3
2
14
3
4
4
2
4
3
1
1
3 4
1
3
4
2
3
2
2
1 31
31
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
1 4 4
1
4
2
32
2
3 3
2
4
2
3
4
1
1
4
3
3
2
3
1
1 3
2
2
1
1
3
3
4
1
3
1
1
3
1
1
2
0
5
10
15
20
St
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 g
ro
wt
h:
 1
99
4−
20
07
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
PC2: State control and intervention
1: Low 2:LowerMiddle 
3:UpperMiddle 4:High 
Growth volatility = 3.88 − 0.51PC1 −0.04PC2 [R.sq = 0.23; Root MSE = 2.56]
Source: IPD 2009 and PWT 6.3
29
Figure 8: Institutions and growth volatility, by growth class
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5 Conclusion
In this document we presented the results of an exploratory study about
countries’ institutions and about their relationship with economic perfor-
mance, using the 2009 (third) wave of the Institutional Profiles Database
(IPD) compiled by the French Development Agency (Agence Franc¸aise de
De´veloppement). The methods of aggregation and analysis are a further de-
velopment of the principal component methodology used by Meisel and Ould
Aoudia (2008) to study the preceding 2006 wave. The 2009 wave provides
material on the institutional framework and functioning of 123 countries
(against 85 in the 2006 wave). 122 countries have been used in this study.
To deal with the large number of questionnaire items covering a wide spec-
trum of institutional aspects and functions we used a two-level hierarchical
principal components analysis. Composite indicators were constructed in
order to facilitate the cross-country comparison of institutional profiles.
The composite (or ‘aggregate’) indicators reveal substantial variation be-
tween countries. Two principal indicators dominate the inter-country varia-
tion, analogous to those found by Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008). The first
is clearly related to the extent of institutional formalization of regulations
and depersonalization of their implementation; the second is interpreted as
the degree of control and intervention by the state. Further study remains
necessary for a good understanding of the precise role that these institutional
dimensions may play in determining countries’ development. The main con-
clusion at this stage is that, in line with Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008),
we find much less dispersion in the degree of control and intervention by the
state amongst countries with formalized regulations than amongst countries
with personalized institutions. We suggest that, while this pattern might be
interpreted as institutional convergence, it could be due to endogeneity or
other biases in the data.
An exploratory analysis of the institutional indicators together with in-
come and growth data is conducted. Meisel and Ould Aoudia (2008) doc-
umented a strong positive relationship between countries’ income level and
the formalization of regulations. This relationship is confirmed here, as well
as a much more ambiguous relationship between income and the degree of
state control and intervention. We find, however, very weak evidence for a
relationship between economic growth and institutions. Countries with little
institutional formalization seem to experience growth rates quite comparable
to those of countries with highly formalized institutions. Based on this ob-
servation it may be concluded (again following Meisel and Ould Aoudia) that
lower-middle-income countries will not achieve higher growth by mimicking
the institutions of high-income countries. On the other hand, it seems that
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stronger regulations and state control in low income countries might well
improve the prospect for growth.
Finally, we find evidence of a significant relationship between growth
volatility and the degree of countries’ formalization of regulations. We find
no such evidence linking growth volatility to the degree of state control and
intervention.
In this exploratory study, we draw no conclusions about the causal na-
ture of the apparent relationships. Nevertheless, our results seem to lend
support to the view that institutional reform programmes need to be very
much tailored to the specificities of the target countries. As is widely ac-
cepted now, uniform prescriptions to regulate formally or to deregulate are
unlikely to be good recipes for growth. We hope further research will help
to understand specific influences of institutional characteristics, for example
the elite’s orientation, on the economic performance of countries.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Countries in the Institutional Profile Database 2009
Table 3: Countries in IPD, listed according to growth class, income
class, and population
Code Country Income class Growth class Population % of
world
popu-
lation
AGO Angola LowerMiddle High 8966.26 .17
ARE United Arab Emi-
rates
High LowerMiddle 2184.2 .04
ARG Argentina UpperMiddle LowerMiddle 34407.2 .65
AUS Australia High UpperMiddle 17607.8 .33
AUT Austria High LowerMiddle 7988.6 .15
AZE Azerbaijan LowerMiddle High 7482.15 .14
BEL Belgium High LowerMiddle 10085.4 .19
BEN Benin Low Low 5250.36 .1
BFA Burkina Faso Low UpperMiddle 9237.7 .17
BGD Bangladesh Low UpperMiddle 119096 2.25
BGR Bulgaria LowerMiddle UpperMiddle 8441.87 .16
BHR Bahrain High LowerMiddle 543.998 .01
BOL Bolivia LowerMiddle LowerMiddle 7054.34 .13
BRA Brazil UpperMiddle LowerMiddle 158512 2.99
BWA Botswana UpperMiddle UpperMiddle 1389.35 .03
CAF Central African
Republic
Low Low 3367.95 .06
CAN Canada High UpperMiddle 28953.3 .55
CHE Switzerland High Low 7058.21 .13
CHL Chile UpperMiddle High 13789.4 .26
CHN China LowerMiddle High 1.2e+06 22.47
CIV Cote d‘Ivoire LowerMiddle Low 13860.6 .26
CMR Cameroon LowerMiddle Low 12920.5 .24
COG Congo, Republic
of
LowerMiddle Low 2488.94 .05
COL Colombia LowerMiddle LowerMiddle 35012 .66
CUB Cuba UpperMiddle High 10756.7 .2
CYP Cyprus High UpperMiddle 718.776 .01
CZE Czech Republic UpperMiddle High 10326.4 .19
DEU Germany High Low 81132.3 1.53
DNK Denmark High UpperMiddle 5188.39 .1
DOM Dominican Re-
public
LowerMiddle High 7488.51 .14
DZA Algeria LowerMiddle LowerMiddle 26916.4 .51
ECU Ecuador LowerMiddle Low 10753.7 .2
EGY Egypt LowerMiddle UpperMiddle 60671.5 1.14
Continued on next page
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ESP Spain High UpperMiddle 39627.6 .75
EST Estonia UpperMiddle High 1491.43 .03
ETH Ethiopia Low LowerMiddle 52803 1
FIN Finland High High 5064.85 .1
FRA France High LowerMiddle 59169.2 1.12
GAB Gabon UpperMiddle Low 1013.16 .02
GBR United Kingdom High UpperMiddle 58026.9 1.1
GHA Ghana Low LowerMiddle 16814.1 .32
GRC Greece High UpperMiddle 10383 .2
GTM Guatemala LowerMiddle Low 9522.88 .18
HKG Hong Kong High UpperMiddle 5934.51 .11
HND Honduras LowerMiddle Low 5229.62 .1
HTI Haiti Low Low 6662.26 .13
HUN Hungary UpperMiddle UpperMiddle 10329 .19
IDN Indonesia LowerMiddle LowerMiddle 191272 3.61
IND India Low High 884943 16.7
IRL Ireland High High 3578.35 .07
IRN Iran UpperMiddle UpperMiddle 60150.9 1.14
ISR Israel High LowerMiddle 4997.77 .09
ITA Italy High LowerMiddle 57026.7 1.08
JOR Jordan LowerMiddle LowerMiddle 3984.24 .08
JPN Japan High Low 124668 2.35
KAZ Kazakhstan UpperMiddle High 16451.6 .31
KEN Kenya Low Low 25817.6 .49
KHM Cambodia Low High 10606.9 .2
KOR Korea, Republic
of
UpperMiddle High 44307 .84
KWT Kuwait High Low 1483.77 .03
LAO Laos Low High 4581.22 .09
LBN Lebanon UpperMiddle Low 3254.86 .06
LBY Libya High Low 4475.68 .08
LKA Sri Lanka LowerMiddle High 17997.2 .34
LTU Lithuania UpperMiddle High 3689 .07
LVA Latvia LowerMiddle High 2565.71 .05
MAR Morocco LowerMiddle LowerMiddle 26403.8 .5
MDG Madagascar Low Low 12736.6 .24
MEX Mexico UpperMiddle LowerMiddle 89749.1 1.69
MLI Mali Low LowerMiddle 8593.64 .16
MLT Malta UpperMiddle LowerMiddle 370.008 .01
MNG Mongolia Low UpperMiddle 2359.69 .04
MOZ Mozambique Low High 13691.4 .26
MRT Mauritania Low Low 2119.24 .04
MUS Mauritius UpperMiddle High 1098.64 .02
MYS Malaysia UpperMiddle High 18753.9 .35
NAM Namibia LowerMiddle Low 1595.14 .03
NER Niger Low Low 8609.31 .16
NGA Nigeria Low High 104200 1.97
Continued on next page
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NIC Nicaragua Low Low 4142.31 .08
NLD Netherlands High LowerMiddle 15274.9 .29
NOR Norway High UpperMiddle 4311.96 .08
NPL Nepal Low LowerMiddle 20641.4 .39
NZL New Zealand High LowerMiddle 3536.64 .07
OMN Oman High Low 1988.75 .04
PAK Pakistan LowerMiddle UpperMiddle 122524 2.31
PAN Panama UpperMiddle UpperMiddle 2538.36 .05
PER Peru LowerMiddle UpperMiddle 22992.7 .43
PHL Philippines LowerMiddle UpperMiddle 69417 1.31
POL Poland UpperMiddle High 38467.7 .73
PRT Portugal UpperMiddle LowerMiddle 9967.83 .19
PRY Paraguay LowerMiddle Low 4622.14 .09
QAT Qatar High High 491.044 .01
ROM Romania LowerMiddle UpperMiddle 22768.5 .43
RUS Russia UpperMiddle UpperMiddle 148390 2.8
SAU Saudi Arabia High Low 18057.8 .34
SDN Sudan Low High 28581.7 .54
SEN Senegal Low Low 8771.81 .17
SGP Singapore High High 3328.15 .06
SVK Slovak Republic UpperMiddle High 5323.58 .1
SVN Slovenia UpperMiddle High 1999.93 .04
SWE Sweden High UpperMiddle 8769.28 .17
SYR Syria LowerMiddle UpperMiddle 13579 .26
TAI Taiwan UpperMiddle High 20848.3 .39
TCD Chad Low UpperMiddle 6379.1 .12
TGO Togo Low Low 3726.01 .07
THA Thailand UpperMiddle UpperMiddle 57400.7 1.08
TUN Tunisia LowerMiddle High 8684.12 .16
TUR Turkey LowerMiddle LowerMiddle 59800.5 1.13
TZA Tanzania Low UpperMiddle 27696.6 .52
UGA Uganda Low UpperMiddle 19424.4 .37
UKR Ukraine UpperMiddle LowerMiddle 51884.2 .98
URY Uruguay UpperMiddle LowerMiddle 3174.79 .06
USA United States High LowerMiddle 260255 4.91
UZB Uzbekistan Low LowerMiddle 22127.6 .42
VEN Venezuela UpperMiddle Low 20691.4 .39
VNM Vietnam Low High 71244 1.34
YEM Yemen Low LowerMiddle 13885.8 .26
ZAF South Africa UpperMiddle LowerMiddle 40940.6 .77
ZAR Congo, Dem.
Rep.
Low Low 43026.9 .81
ZMB Zambia Low UpperMiddle 8670.84 .16
ZWE Zimbabwe LowerMiddle Low 10976.4 .21
Sources: IPD 2009, PWT 6.3
Population (in thousands) is from 1993
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6.2 Extract from the questionnaire
Code and name: A300, transparency of public economic action
Scale: 0 = no information published. If there is information, from 1 =
unreliable to 4 = totally reliable
Table 4: IPD Extract
Code Survey question Scale
A3000 Government budget from 0 to 4
A3001 Extra-budgetary funds 4 = no extra-budgetary
funds
A3002 Accounts of state-owned enterprises from 0 to 4
A3003 Accounts of public banks from 0 to 4
A3004 Basic economic and financial statistics
(national accounts, price indices, for-
eign trade, currency and credit, etc)
from 0 to 4
A3005 Is IMF consultation under Article IV
published?
no =0, partially =2, to-
tally =4
6.3 Recoding
For the following elementary variables and observations, we aimed to ‘neu-
tralize’ the data as much as possible. Two countries, Hong Kong and Sin-
gapore, have no rural areas. For these countries, the survey question about
rural areas in countries without rural territory do not apply, the rural-area
phenomena indicators are given the same score as the urban-area phenom-
ena (for example, in B606, B609, B705, and D900). Similarly, some countries
have no sub-national level of governance; for such countries, the score allo-
cated to the national level is also allocated to the question addressing the
sub-national level (A107 and A108). For some countries, it is indicated that
there are no ‘other armed bodies (paramilitary police, official militia, others,
etc.)’ (A2013). For these countries, the score given to this elementary vari-
able is the simple mean of the answers given to the other three sub-questions
under this elementary variable (‘Political authority control over the legal
armed forces: Over the army’ (A2010); ‘Over the police’ (A2011); and ‘Over
the secret services’ (A2012)).
For some countries, it is indicated that there are no public banks. In
such cases, scores for question A3003: ‘Transparency of public economic
action - Accounts of public banks’ are the same as for the question regarding
state-owned enterprises: A3002: ‘Transparency of public economic action
- Accounts of state-owned enterprises’. Re-codifications are made for the
questions referring to natural resources (B3030 and B3031) or the presence
of minorities within the population (B6082). A country without natural
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resources or without such groups is given the median score of all the non-
zero answers for the other countries. We constructed the indicator A908f,
‘Subsidy on commodities’ from B4041 (direct commodity price subsidies)
and B4042 (Oil: deviation between pump prices and world prices). The
aggregated elementary variable A908f is arbitrarily constructed as follows: 1
x B4041 (reversed) + 1/3 x B4042 (reversed) and then put in the range 0-4.
6.4 Particular Cases in Aggregation
The survey results of some elementary variables are problematic to aggre-
gate by their weighted average; they are better aggregated by multiplication,
in order to better accommodate the nature of the questions. The indica-
tor B701 ‘Competition in distribution (household consumption)’ has three
sub-questions consisting of: B7010 ‘Share of supermarkets in the retail trade
(household consumption)’; B7011 ‘Share of distribution delivered by large
national firms’; B7012 ‘Share of distribution delivered by large foreign firms’.
The responses to these sub-questions are aggregated by multiplication. Re-
sults are rescaled to a range of 0 - 4. Multiplicative aggregation is also used
for C900 ‘Micro-lending’. This indicator has 3 elementary variables: C9000
‘Informal micro-lending’; C9001 ‘Institutional micro-lending (supported by
NGOs, banks, etc.)’; C9002 ‘Quality of micro-lending guarantees (informal
or institutional)’. Results are rescaled to the range 0 - 4.
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6.5 Income Classes
Figure 9: Country classification by income (for function ‘Political institu-
tions’ see figure 1 in main text)
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6.6 Growth Classes
Figure 10: Country classification by growth (for function ‘Regulations and
corporate governance’ see figure 2 in main text)
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